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A PRIORI VETO POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OF POLAND
The a priori power of the president of Poland, lower chamber of parliament (Sejm) and upper
chamber of parliament (Senate) in the process of legislation are considered in this paper. The evalua-
tion of power is made using the Johnston power index.
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1. Introduction
In Poland, in the process of legislation, any bill accepted by the Sejm (the lower
chamber of the Polish parliament) is considered by the Senate, which may accept,
amend or reject a bill. If a bill is amended or rejected by the Senate, then it goes back
to the Sejm. The Sejm may, by absolute majority, reject the Senate’s objection. After
that, a bill accepted by the Sejm goes to the president of Poland who can within 21
days accept and sign a bill or may declare his veto and send a bill back to the Sejm.
The presidential veto is considered as a cognizable attribute of the president re-
garding any bill resolved by parliament. According to the Constitutional Act, the
president signs and declares a bill in the official monitor (gazette). In the case of im-
portant state interests or poor quality of constituted law, the president may reject a bill.
Presidential rejection of a bill (veto) has a conditional character: the Sejm may accept
a bill once more by a majority of 3/5 of votes in the presence of at least half of the
members of the Sejm (representatives). In this case, the president has to sign a bill
within seven days and publish the bill in the official monitor. The real effectiveness of
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the president’s veto is therefore strongly subordinated to the present structure of par-
ties in the Sejm.
Another way for the president to stop the legislation process is by sending an un-
signed bill to the Constitutional Court asking it to establish a bill’s conformity to the
Constitutional Act. If the Constitutional Court declares the bill’s conformity to the
Constitutional Act, the president must sign it and may not declare his/her veto
against it.
2. Analysis of the power of the members
of a legislative process
The analysis of the power of members of a legislative process will be conducted
via so called power indices. There are many different power indices in the literature.
Among them, the most popular are the SHAPLEY–SHUBIK power index [5], [6] and the
BANZHAF power index [1]. These two indices came from game theory
2 and are well
tailored to an a priori evaluation of the ability to form a winning coalition (the
Shapley–Shubik index of power) or of the permanency of a coalition
3 (the Banzhaf
index of power). However, something different needs to be used when analysing the
legislation process. A winning coalition must be formed, but the way to do so is
a sequence of decisions whose summary results in a bill at the end of it. In the litera-
ture (for example [2]) it is assumed that the Johnston power index [3] is the best suited
to reflect and evaluate this process.
For the Johnston power index, it is crucial to define a so called vulnerable coali-
tion.
Definition: a winning coalition is vulnerable if, among its members, there is at
least one whose defection would cause the coalition to lose
4. Such a member is called
critical. If only one player is critical, then this player is uniquely powerful in the coa-
lition.
For example, a president in coalition with 232 representatives (simple majority +1) is
uniquely powerful. If, however, a coalition comprises of exactly the president and 231
representatives, then the president, as well as any other member of the coalition, shares
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power equally with 231 other players
5. In such a coalition there are 232 critical members
and each has 1/232 of the power.
Defining the Johnston power index, first we count the number of players that are
critical in each vulnerable coalition c (critical defections). The inverse of the number
of critical defections is called the fractional defections for the coalition, f(c). For ex-
ample, if there are only two such players in the coalition c, then f(c) = 1/2.
The Johnston power of player i is the sum of the fractional critical defections over
all the vulnerable coalitions in which i is critical, divided by the total number of frac-
tional critical defections of all players, in other words, i’s proportion of fractional
critical defections.
Let V be the set of all vulnerable coalitions. Formally, for each vulnerable coalition
V c∈ , we define the set  ) (c fi
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Let us consider the following example: the game [4; 3, 2, 1], i.e. voting where
there are three voters with 3, 2 and 1 votes each. The majority needed for a decision is
4. The following are vulnerable coalitions in this game: (3, 2), (3, 1) and (3, 2, 1) (vul-
nerable coalitions must be winning coalitions).
Table 1. The Johnston power indexes for the game [4; 3, 2, 1]
















(3, 2) 1 1 1 0
1/2
1/2 0
(3, 1) 1 1 0 1
1/2 0
1/2
(3, 2, 1) 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
T o t a l 3 3 112
1/2
1/2
J(i) 4/6 1/6 1/6
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It is easy to notice that the vector (4/6, 1/6, 1/6) of Johnston power indexes in this
example differs from the vector of Banzhaf power indexes (3/5, 1/5, 1/5) and is equal
to the vector of Shapley–Shubik power indexes (4/6, 1/6, 1/6).
3. Analysis of the enactment of bills
In Poland all bills are resolved if:
– an absolute majority of representatives (p) and the president (z) are for
6, or
– in the case of a veto by the president, at least 3/5 of the representatives are for
7.












Fig. 1. Legislative procedure in the Polish parliamentary system
(Sejm stands for the House of Representatives)
Therefore, we have coalitions:  ) ..., , , , (
460 2 1 j j j p p p z  where z denotes the president and
p denotes a representative. Some of these coalitions are winning, some are not. Below,
one can find derivations of vulnerable (winning) coalitions in the three following cases:
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• case #1: we assume that there are no party structures in the parliament,
• case #2: just the Sejm has party structures, and
• case #3: the president favours one of the opposition parties.
We would like to find out how the above assumptions influence the a priori esti-
mate of the power of each member of the legislative process, with special emphasis
given to the position of the president.
Case #1.
In case #1 we assume that each member (including the representatives) of the leg-
islative process is autonomous and acts independently. This is equivalent to the situa-
tion in which party affiliation, both of the president and representatives, is no longer
valid. There is only one criterion for supporting or opposing a bill: an individual’s
personal attitude for or against the bill, not party discipline or belonging to the gov-
erning coalition. This means that we are analyzing the case of a hypothetical 3-level
system of legislation.
In case #1 the winning coalitions are as follows
8:
• ) ..., , , , (
2 1 n j j j p p p z , where  231 ≥ n  (we also assume that all representatives par-
ticipate in each vote).
Among the winning coalitions, the following coalitions are vulnerable:
• for n = 231 all the players, i.e. the president and 231 representatives, are critical,
• for  232 ≤ n < 276 only the president is critical.
Note, that for n ≥ 276 all coalitions are winning, but no one member of such
a coalition is critical.
Case #2.
In case #2 we assume that the representatives are members of parties and they vote ac-
cording to the party leaders. The structure of the sixth Polish Sejm is presented in table 2.
Table 2. Structure of the Sejm
9
Description Party Number of seats
a Civic Platform 208
b Law and Justice 157
c Leftwing (Lewica) 42
d Polish Popular Party (PSL) 31
e SDPL – New Leftwing 5
f Poland XXI 5
g Democratic Faction of Representatives 3
h Non-affiliated representatives 9
In total 460
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In case #2 there are two types of winning coalitions
10:
• (z, {a, d}, S),
where:
S can be formed from any factions of the parliament, except Civil Platform and PSL.
S can be any of the following sets: {∅}, {b}, {c}, {e}, {f}, {g}, {h}, {b, c}, {b, e}, {b,
f}, {b, g}, {b, h}, {c, e}, {c, f}, {c, g}, {c, h}, {e, f}, {e, g}, {e, h}, {f, g}, {f, h}, {g,
h}, {b, c, e}, {b, c, f}, {b, c, g}, {b, c, h}, {b, e, f}, {b, e, g}, {b, e, h}, {b, f, g}, {b, f,
h}, {b, g, h}, {c, e, f}, {c, e, g}, {c, e, h}, {c, f, g}, {c, f, h}, {c, g, h}, {e, f, g}, {e, f,
h}, {f, g, h}, {b, c, e, f}, {b, c, e, g}, {b, c, e, h}, {b, c, f, g}, {b, c, f, h}, {b, c, g, h}, {b, e,
f, g}, {b, e, f, h}, {b, e, g, h}, {b, f, g, h}, {c, e, f, g}, {c, e, f, h}, {c, e, g, h}, {c, f, g,
h}, {e, f, g, h}, {b, c, e, f, g}, {b, c, e, f, h}, {b, c, e, g, h}, {b, c, f, g, h}, {b, e, f, g, h},
{c, e, f, g, h}, {b, c, e, f, g, h}, and
• ({a, d}, S),
where:
S could be any of the following sets: {b}, {c},{b, c}, {b, e}, {b, f}, {b, g}, {b, h}, {c, e},
{c, f}, {c, g}, {c, h}, {b, c, e}, {b, c, f}, {b, c, g}, {b, c, h}, {b, e, f}, {b, e, g}, {b, e, h},
{b, f, g}, {b, f, h}, b, g, h}, {c, e, f}, {c, e, g}, {c, e, h}, {c, f, g}, {c, f, h}, {c, g, h},
{b, c, e, f}, {b, c, e, g}, {b, c, e, h}, {b, c, f, g}, {b, c, f, h}, {b, c, g, h}, {b, e, f, g}, {b, e, f, h},
{b, e, g, h}, {b, f, g, h}, {c, e, f, g}, {c, e, f, h}, {c, e, g, h}, {c, f, g, h}, {b, c, e, f, g},
{b, c, e, f, h}, {b, c, e, g, h}, {b, c, f, g, h}, {b, e, f, g, h}, {c, e, f, g, h}, {b, c, e, f, g, h}.
Searching for vulnerable coalitions, we find that:
If card(S) ≤ 37, then
11 the coalition  ) }, , { , ( S d a z  is vulnerable; the critical players
are the president and the “governmental” coalition {a, d}.
If card(S) > 37, then the coalition  ) }, , { , ( S d a z  is vulnerable, but only the
“governmental” set {a, d} is critical.
None of e, f , g , h can be critical as a member of coalition  ) }, , { , ( S d a z  or
({a, d}, S).
If 37 < card(S) < 199, then the coalition ({a, d}, S) is vulnerable; the critical play-
ers are the “governmental” coalition {a, d} and one element of the set {b, c}, depend-
ing on which one is included in S.
If card(S) ≥ 199, then the coalition ({a, d}, S) is vulnerable; the only critical player
is the “governmental” coalition {a, d}.
Case #3.
In case #3 we assume that the president acts in the same way as one of the opposi-
tion parties, namely Law and Justice (PiS). Therefore, case #3 is similar to case #2,
since the winning coalitions are of the form  ) }, , { }, , ({ S d a b z  or ({a, d}, S).
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For ) }, , { }, , ({ S d a b z , S could be any of the following subsets: {∅}, {c}, {e}, {f},
{g}, {h}, {c, e}, {c, f}, {c, g}, {c, h}, {e, f}, {e, g}, {e, h}, {f, g}, {f, h}, {g, h}, {c, e, f},
{c, e, g}, {c, e, h}, {c, f, g}, {c, f, h}, {c, g, h}, {c, g, h}, {e, f, g}, {e, f, h}, {f, g, h},
{c, e, f, g}, {c, e, f, h}, {c, f, g, h}, {e, f, g, h}, {c, e, f, g, h}.
For ({a, d}, S), S could be any of the following subsets: {c}, {c, e}, {c, f}, {c, h},
{e, g}, {c, e, f}, {c, e, g}, {c, e, h}, {c, f, g}, {c, f, h}, {c, g, h}, {c, g, h}, {c, e, f, g},
{c, e, f, h}, {c, f, g, h}, {c, e, f, g, h}.
Again, searching for a vulnerable coalition, one obtains the following conditions:
If card(S) ≤ 37, then the coalition  ) }, , { }, , ({ S d a b z  is vulnerable; the critical play-
ers are the president together with the major opposition party PiS
12 and the
“governmental” coalition {a, d}.
If card(S) > 37, then the coalition  ) }, , { }, , ({ S d a b z  is vulnerable but only the
“governmental” set {a, d} is critical.
None of e, f, g, h can be critical as a member of coalition  ) }, , { }, , ({ S d a b z  or
({a, d}, S).
If card(S) > 37, then the coalition ({a, d}, S) is vulnerable and the “governmental”
set {a, d} and player {c} are critical.
4. Power analysis
Having the list of all the winning coalitions at one’s disposal, one can calculate the
a priori Johnston index of power. All three cases are presented below.
Case #1.
Among the winning coalitions there are the following vulnerable coalitions:
• for n = 231 all players, i.e. the president and representatives are critical. There-
fore, the Johnston fraction of critical defections for each of them equals
232 / 1 ) ( = • f .
There are  137 1.10E
231
460






 coalitions with the president and  136 5.5347E
230
459






with a given representative.
• for 232 ≤ n < 276 only the president is critical and the Johnston fraction of critical































138 1.323E+ =  such coalitions.
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The above results give the following values of the Johnston index of power:
• for the president: 0.92342978817
• for a representative: 0.0001664570
• for the Sejm as a whole: 0.0765702118
Case #2.
Let us recall that in case #2 we take into account the party affiliation of represen-
tatives by assuming that they vote according to their party leaders. We also know the
present governing coalition (Civic Platform and PSL).
The results of the calculations for coalitions  ) }, , { , ( S d a z  and ({a, d}, S) are pre-
sented in tab. 3 and tab. 4, respectively.
Table 3. Calculation of Johnston power index for case #2 and coalition (z, {a, d}, S)
Fraction of critical defections Vulnerable
coalitions










































{f, g, h}1 7
1/2
1/2
{e, f, h}1 9
1/2
1/2




{c, g}4 5 1
{c, e}4 7 1
{c, f}4 7 1
{c, e, g}5 0 1
{c, f, g}5 0 1
{c, h}5 1 1
{c, e, f}5 2 1
{c, g, h}5 4 1A priori veto power of the president of Poland 69
12 3 4
{c, e, f, g}5 5 1
{c, e, h}5 6 1
{c, f, h}5 6 1
{c, e, g, h}5 9 1
{c, f, g, h}5 9 1
{c, e, f, h}6 1 1
{c, e, f, g, h}6 4 1
{b} 157 1
{b, g} 160 1
{b, e} 162 1
{b, f} 162 1
{b, e, g} 165 1
{b, f, g} 165 1
{b, h} 166 1
{b, e, f, } 167 1
{b, g, h} 169 1
{b, e, f, g} 170 1
{b, e, h} 171 1
{b, f, h} 171 1
{b, e, g, h} 174 1
{b, f, g, h} 174 1
{b, e, f, h} 176 1
{b, e, f, g, h} 179 1
{b, c} 199 1
{b, c, g} 202 1
{b, c, e} 204 1
{b, c, f} 204 1
{b, c, e, g} 207 1
{b, c, f, g} 207 1
{b, c, h} 208 1
{b, c, e, f} 209 1
{b, c, g, h} 211 1
{b, c, e, f, g} 212 1
{b, c, e, h} 213 1
{b, c, f, h} 213 1
{b, c, e, g, h} 216 1
{b, c, f, g, h} 216 1
{b, c, e, f, h} 218 1
{b, c, e, f, g, h} 221 1
In total: 7.5 55.5J.W. MERCIK 70
Table 4. Calculation of the Johnston power index for case #2 and coalition ({a, d}, S)
Fraction of critical defections Vulnerable
coalitions






















{c, e, g}5 0
1/2
1/2






{c, e, f}5 2
1/2
1/2
{c, g, h}5 4
1/2
1/2
{c, e, f, g}5 5
1/2
1/2
{c, e, h}5 6
1/2
1/2
{c, f, h}5 6
1/2
1/2
{c, e, g, h}5 9
1/2
1/2
{c, f, g, h}5 9
1/2
1/2
{c, e, f, h}6 1
1/2
1/2















{b, e, g} 165
1/2
1/2






{b, e, f, } 167
1/2
1/2
{b, g, h} 169
1/2
1/2
{b, e, f, g} 170
1/2
1/2
{b, e, h} 171
1/2
1/2
{b, f, h} 171
1/2
1/2
{b, e, g, h} 174
1/2
1/2
{b, f, g, h} 174
1/2
1/2
{b, e, f, h} 176
1/2
1/2
{b, e, f, g, h} 179
1/2
1/2
{b, c} 199 1
{b, c, g} 202 1
{b, c, e} 204 1
{b, c, f} 204 1
{b, c, e, g} 207 1
{b, c, f, g} 207 1
{b, c, h} 208 1
{b, c, e, f} 209 1A priori veto power of the president of Poland 71
12 3 4 5 6
{b, c, g, h} 211 1
{b, c, e, f, g} 212 1
{b, c, e, h} 213 1
{b, c, f, h} 213 1
{b, c, e, g, h} 216 1
{b, c, f, g, h} 216 1
{b, c, e, f, h} 218 1
{b, c, e, f, g, h} 221 1
In total: 0 32 8 8
For case #2 the a priori Johnston power indexes are as follows:
• for the president: 0.067568,
• for the government: 0.788288,
• for party {b} (PiS) and {c} (Leftwing): 0.072072 each,
which means that in the Polish parliamentary system for the duration of the sixth Par-
liament, the government is 11.66 times stronger than the president.
Indirectly we also obtain an answer to the question as to which factions of parlia-
ment the president and the governmental coalition, respectively, should form coali-
tions with: for the president it is better to form a coalition with an “S”, for which
card(S) < 39 (upper part of tab. 3). For the governmental coalition it is better to act in
quite the reverse way (lower part of tab.3), which is obvious.
Case #3.
In this case we assume that the president conducts his voting together with the big-
gest opposition party, namely PiS (denoted in tab. 2 by b). One can find the results
obtained under this assumption in tabs. 5 and 6.
Table 5. Johnston power index for case #3 with coalition ({z, b},{a, d}, S)
Fraction of critical defections Vulnerable coalitions
({z, b},{a, d},S) for S = card(S)







































{f, g, h}1 7
1/2
1/2
{e, f, h}1 9
1/2
1/2




{c, g}4 5 1
{c, e}4 7 1
{c, f}4 7 1
{c, e, g}5 0 1
{c, f, g}5 0 1
{c, h}5 1 1
{c, e, f}5 2 1
{c, g, h}5 4 1
{c, e, f, g}5 5 1
{c, e, h}5 6 1
{c, f, h}5 6 1
{c, f, g, h}5 9 1
{c, e, f, h}6 1 1
{c, e, f, g, h}6 4 1
In total: 7.5 22.5
Table 6. Johnston power index for case #3 with coalition ({a, d}, S)
Fraction of critical defections Vulnerable coalitions
({a, d}, S) for S = card(S)













{c, e, g}5 0
1/2
1/2






{c, e, f}5 2
1/2
1/2
{c, g, h}5 4
1/2
1/2
{c, e, f, g}5 5
1/2
1/2
{c, e, h}5 6
1/2
1/2
{c, f, h}5 6
1/2
1/2
{c, f, g, h}5 9
1/2
1/2
{c, e, f, h}6 1
1/2
1/2
{c, e, f, g, h}6 4
1/2
1/2
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For case #3, the changes compared to case #2 can be seen in the possibilities for
forming the coalition S: the number of such coalitions is less than in case #3. All the
remaining conditions are unchanged. Therefore, the Johnston power indexes are as
follows:
• for the president: 0.166667
• for the government: 0.666667,
• for party {c} (Leftwing): 0.166667,
which means that in the Polish legislative system and under the conditions of the sixth
Sejm, the governmental coalition is still stronger than the president, but only 4 times
stronger. This results directly from the coalition of the president with the biggest op-
position party
13.
The suggested coalition partners for the president and the government, respec-
tively, are the same as in case #2.
5. Conclusions
A summary of all the calculations of the Johnston power index under the different
assumptions used are presented in tab. 7.
Table 7. Summary of the calculations of the Johnston power index
under the different assumptions used (the values for the USA are taken from [2])
Johnston power index
Case #1 Case #2 Case #3 USA
President 0.9234 0.0676 0.1668 0.7700
Sejm (government
for case #2 and #3)
0.0766 0.9324 0.8332 0.0736
Senate 0 0 0 0.1560
On the basis of the Johnston power indexes obtained one may give the following
conclusions:
1) The legislative structure (president–Sejm–Senate or the equivalent in the USA)
without an inside party structure (case #1) are similar in Poland and the USA. One
may suppose that introducing a veto overruling condition for the Senate in Poland
would make these results even more similar.
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2) The multi-party system in the Polish parliament radically affects the values of the
Johnston power index in Poland and the USA. The a priori power of the governmental
coalition is much higher than the power of the president. This is a direct result of the fact
that the governing coalition is formed by a majority parliamentary coalition.
3) An alliance of the president with one of the major opposition parties increases his
power as measured by the Johnston power index. Evidently, this is important only in the
situation of so called cohabitation, i.e. when the president and the governmental coalition
are from opposite factions of the parliament. The Johnston power index is not suited for
the case in which the president and the government represent the same political faction
(party). In this case, the president would not veto a bill supported by the government.
4) It seems that the Senate should be empowered by enabling it to overrule vetoes
by the president. The present power of the Senate, measured by the Johnston power
index, is a good argument for its eventual liquidation.
In most cases, the power of the right to veto cannot be measured directly, because
this right is only part of the characteristics of players. However, we can indirectly esti-
mate the influence of the right to veto on the power of a player by comparing her power
both with and without this right. Quite intuitively, the right of veto will increase the
power of a player in most cases. It is not so obvious how large this increase will be and
in some cases power is associated only with the right to veto (as is the case of the presi-
dent of Poland and parliament with a party structure). This example calculates the meas-
ure of power of the right to veto in absolute terms. In most cases it is not possible to
measure it so directly.
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Aprioryczna siła weta prezydenta RP
W Polsce w procesie ustawodawczym ustawę przyjętą przez Sejm rozpatruje Senat, który ma prawo
zgłosić do niej poprawki lub ją odrzucić (po odrzuceniu ustawa wraca do Sejmu, gdzie bezwzględną
większością głosów można odrzucić sprzeciw Senatu). Uchwalona przez Sejm i Senat ustawa trafia na-
stępnie do Prezydenta RP, który może w ciągu 21 dni przyjąć i podpisać ją, bądź zgłosić weto i przeka-
zać do ponownego rozpatrzenia Sejmowi.
Weto Prezydenta RP to jego kompetencja do sprzeciwu wobec ustawy uchwalonej przez Sejm.
Zgodnie z Konstytucją RP prezydent podpisuje i zarządza ogłoszenie ustawy w Dzienniku Ustaw RP.
Może on jednak, kierując się ważnym interesem państwa i dbałością o jakość stanowionego prawa, od-
mówić podpisania ustawy. Taka odmowa ma charakter weta zawieszającego, ponieważ Sejm może po-
wtórnie uchwalić ustawę większością 3/5 głosów w obecności co najmniej połowy ustawowej liczby
posłów. W tym wypadku prezydent musi w ciągu 7 dni podpisać ustawę i zarządzić jej ogłoszenie
w Dzienniku Ustaw RP. Rzeczywista skuteczność sprzeciwu prezydenta jest więc uzależniona od układu
sił w Sejmie. W pracy przedstawiono ocenę aprioryczną siły prezydenta, Sejmu i Senatu w procesie usta-
wodawczym w Polsce. Ocenę przeprowadzono z użyciem indeksu siły Johnstona.
Słowa kluczowe: siła aprioryczna, indeks Johnsona, prezydent RP